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ABSTRACT
As the business plans of European and US legacy carriers mature and adapt to deregulation, 
open skies and competition from LCCs, new strategies have developed to feed hubs and 
operate the route system in efficient and more cost effective ways.  These strategies appear to 
differ based on the airline’s business plan, hub location, economy, political influence, level of 
competition and operating environment. 
In particular, a wide range of different approaches are apparent to dealing with non-hub 
services - as this is where the airline's competitive position is weaker. These include use of 
regional affiliates, low-cost subsidiaries, outsourcing and swaps of slots and assets. Mainline 
branding may be adopted or a stand-alone brand developed. The role of marketing tools such 
as FFPs, code-shares and alliances provides an important differentiator from the pure low-
cost segment of the market. This paper critically evaluates these operating solutions for 
selected legacy carriers and network locations. The strategies will be assessed within the 
context of each country's airline environment. Conclusions are drawn about which 
approaches are more or less effective given the business objectives of the carriers chosen for 
analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, airline networks in the US and Europe have become characterised by the 
traditional network ('legacy' or 'flag') operators concentrating on their major hubs while the 
rapidly growing low-cost carriers have come to dominate many regional and secondary 
airports. This paper therefore aims to investigate the strategies of the network carriers away 
from their main hub airports, as this has been a somewhat neglected area of research. While 
influenced by both the dominant trends identified above, a number of different developments 
can be identified. In some cases this stems from the local competitive conditions and in others 
from variations in the market characteristics (O'Connor and Fuellhart, 2013) or operational 
environments. It is fair to say however that few of these are major centres of growth for the 
airlines concerned - it is primarily an exercise in managing decline most effectively. As the 
US is in many respects a lead market for changes that subsequently filter through to Europe 
and other parts of the world, this region will be considered first. A review of the European 
situation follows. Conclusions can then be drawn and the most promising strategies identified 
for the traditional airlines in the unfashionable 'cinderella' locations of their networks. 
2. THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
Economic and competitive pressures since 2000 have changed the way airlines operate hubs 
and feed passengers into those hubs.  Core changes in the business models of major carriers 
have caused them to transfer Available Seat Miles (ASMs) to independent regional carriers.
2.1 Hubs as an alternative to interline agreements
Airline hubs developed in the 1970s and 1980s.  While hubs began in Europe as flag carriers 
concentrate passenger feed in their capitals or other large cities of commerce, they evolved in 
the United States as airlines sought a business strategy to survive and prosper after 
deregulation.
Historically airlines developed “interline agreements” with other carriers.  This effectively 
provides the passenger with a wide selection of destinations to choose from.  Passengers 
could begin their journey on one carrier and transfer to another carrier in intermediate cities 
to complete their journey.  While generally convenient for a passenger, the airlines carrying 
this passenger on the interline journey had to share the revenue.  The portion of the revenue 
that each carrier in the itinerary received was determined by the conditions of the interline 
agreement.  The evolution of the hub strategy meant that the originating airline could keep 
the total of the revenue for themselves.  The efficiency of the hub is that not only does it keep 
passengers on a single carrier, it increases the number of city pairs available for sale to 
passengers by the square of the number of spokes (Doganis, 2010, pp. 244-245).
2.2 Airline operational assumptions at airports
It is important to note that, unlike the privatized European environment, airports in the United 
States are owned by governmental or quasi-governmental entities.  Like the European 
practice, landing fees are charged to airlines on a maximum landed weight concept.  
However, terminal charges are based on leases for space within the terminal building, not on 
a per passenger or ramp use program.  While each method has its efficiencies and problems, 
the approaches and vehicles for capital funding and cost allocation are different.  As a result, 
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risk sharing and capital financing methods impose various costs on carriers’ operational 
business plans in different ways.
Because of the terminal lease environment in the United States, the cost of creating a hub for 
a given carrier was considerable because additional space at the airport had to be leased.  This 
commitment was often for ten or fifteen years, sometimes longer.  Debt service for capital 
investment on long term projects was also expensive.  Gates were leased on an exclusive 
basis, meaning that only the airline leasing the gate could use it.  The lease cost was the same 
whether the gate was in use all day or only used a couple of times a day.  The airport got their 
money one way or the other.  Effectively the exclusive nature of the gate lease kept other 
carriers from using the gate and protected market share for the leaseholder.  This additional 
cost was deemed worthwhile because of the additional revenue generated by keeping a 
passenger on the same carrier rather than sharing with another carrier.  Spread over the year 
the additional RPMs generated could be considerable.  Further efficiencies were to be gained 
by higher aircraft utilization.
In practice, however, many gates, especially at cities on either coast, would be empty for a 
good part of the day after the morning banks left until the evening banks arrived from the 
other coast.  Hubs in the central section of the country (ORD, DEN, DFW, SLC, MSP and to 
some extent ATL which served flight banks heading north as well as west) experienced 
several banks per day as flights arrived first going west from the East coast and then flights 
going east from the West coast.
These hubs located in the mid-section of the US meet the five characteristics for effective 
hubs identified by Doganis (2010, p.250).  They possess:  1) a central geographic location, 2) 
sufficient runway capacity, 3) a single terminal building for the hub airline (ATL is an 
exception to this with several unit terminals serving Delta), 4) strong local demand in the hub 
city, and 5) an airline willing to develop the hub with banks of arriving and departing flights. 
From and operational and fleet utilization perspective, it was apparent at an early stage in the 
evolution of US hubs that many of the types of aircraft being flown by the mainline carriers 
were too large to efficiently serve smaller cities at the end of hub spokes.
Services were developed using smaller aircraft to fly passengers to and from smaller outlying 
cities to larger cities with mainline service.  These smaller carriers were privately owned and 
were often hand-to-mouth operations.  Though a variety of aircraft were used, generally 
aircraft used were propeller aircraft with up to 19 seats.
In 1980 there were 247 regional and commuter carriers operating in the United States.  In 
2011 there were 60.  The average seating capacity in 1980 was 16 seats per aircraft rising to 
56 seats in 2011(Regional Airline Association, 2012).
2.3 Economic pressures affecting the hub system
As Southwest Airlines developed and perfected the now well-known Low Cost Carrier (LCC) 
business model and the evaporation of the dotcom bubble in 2000, the commercial airline 
economic environment in the United States changed.  Capital funding became harder to 
obtain, and many carriers faced bankruptcy again.  Chief among the causes of this industry 
weakness was too much capacity in the form of too many seats chasing too few passengers.   
Business objectives continued to be based on a continuing drive for market share rather than 
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revenue generation exacerbated by loose discipline on the cost side in all areas including 
lease costs, labor costs and airport costs.  These elements were especially apparent at the 
capital intensive hubs.
Bankruptcy was a way to help lower costs, especially abrogating expensive union contracts.  
It also presented an opportunity to renegotiate vendor relationships and contracts as well.  
Mergers could be clumsy, but presented a further opportunity to develop efficiencies of scale 
and lower unit costs.
On the airport side, the all carriers approached the new environment by seeking to rid 
themselves of exclusive leased space as lease and operating agreements became due.  There 
was greater use of preferential and common use gate agreements along with shorter lease 
terms.  The airlines realized, to a greater or lesser extent, that a large portion of the cost basis 
of airport rents was driven by debt service costs associated with large capital projects creating 
new exclusive use gates and associated infrastructure.  In this new milieu airlines were more 
willing to share preferential gates at a lower lease rate and at a lower term commitment rather 
than continue to exclusively lease expensive gates inefficiently used.  The operative concept 
here is that with preferential gates a given airline gets first choice to use.  In a lease 
agreement with an airport the more passengers an airline puts through a given gate, the lower 
the cost of the gate is on a per passenger basis (Cost Per Enplanement – CPE).  The effect is 
to lower unit costs in the terminal environment for the airline.
2.4 The evolution of the airline business model in the hub environment
As the hub business model evolved and matured, the mainline carriers cancelled interline 
agreements with other mainline carriers.  But they continued to enter into interline 
agreements with regional and commuter carriers (from this point forward we will include 
smaller commuter and third-level carriers under the general term “regional carriers.”).  This 
relationship was for the regional carriers to supply passenger feed from the outlying cities 
into the hub as the mainline carriers withdrew capacity.  At this stage of development these 
relationships did not include any equity exposure for the mainline carrier.  In very general 
terms this business model has come full circle as mainline carriers first continued interline 
agreements with regionals, then developed or bought regionals of their own, and finally 
divested their equity positions and entered agreements with independent regional carriers on a 
franchise or code-share basis.  Exceptions to this trend include the Alaska Air Group (Alaska 
Airlines and Horizon Air) and AMR Corp (American Airlines and American Eagle).  
However, their corporate relationship has evolved too through the use of capacity purchase 
agreements (CPA).
Evidence of this willingness to tie themselves to regionals with equity interest in the late 
1970s and 1980s can be seen as some mainline carriers sought to establish partnerships with 
regional carriers by creating holding companies and corporations which controlled both the 
mainline carrier and one or more regional carriers.  Each carrier held its own operating 
license, had its own board and management, and was responsible for its own profit and loss.  
The objective of the business relationship was to get economies of scale, higher efficiency 
and market share.  The separate airlines had separate pay scales, operating economies and 
yield capabilities.  Examples of this corporate relationship are AMR (American Airlines and 
American Eagle), the Alaska Air Group (Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air) and Delta Air 
Lines (Delta Air Lines and Comair).
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Other regional carriers such as SkyWest and Mesa remained independent and flew under 
interline and code share arrangements with a variety of mainline carriers.  Sometimes this 
flying was done in the livery of the mainline carrier (SkyWest flying for United as United 
Connection).  Some flew in their own livery (Mesa flying for America West).
In 2007 it appeared that this strategy had succeeded as the airline business was recovering 
from the events of September 11, 2001, and the dotcom implosion of March 2000.  Profit 
from domestic operations in 2000 was $5.4 b.  By the end of 2001, however, this number had 
become a -$8.7b loss.  Then, by 2007 the airline business could report domestic profits of 
$4.9b, well within striking distance of 2000 levels.  But the financial crisis of 2008 once 
again contributed to a domestic airline industry loss of -$3.7b (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2013a).  At this point the airline business model began to change 
dramatically.
A series of bankruptcies and mergers after 2000 set the stage for a re-examination of business 
strategies.  Northwest Airlines and Delta Air Lines declared bankruptcy in September 2005 
and, after exiting bankruptcy, merged in 2008.  American Airlines, the last major US carrier 
except Alaska Airlines and Southwest Airlines to avoid bankruptcy, finally followed the 
other major carriers and declared bankruptcy in November 2011.  Once American emerges 
from bankruptcy, it will merge with US Airways.  This will leave four major carriers in the 
United States:  American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines and Southwest Airlines.  
A second tier includes JetBlue and Alaska Airlines.
Airline consolidation and cost pressures from LLCs as well as volatile fuel prices in the 
recessionary economic environment after 2007 caused most carriers to approach their 
business in three ways as never before.
2.4 Capacity Discipline
The industry practiced strong capacity discipline in the domestic market.   Figure 2.1 
demonstrates the ASM decrease as the 2008 recession took hold.  The ASMs actually 
decreased at a faster rate than the decrease in RPMs.  As the recovery occurred, the RPMs 
increased at a faster rate than the ASMs (Figure 2.1).  


















Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.1
This strategy created much higher load factors (Figure 2.2), but these are considered 
acceptable in light of the customers demand for low fares.  This is a successful strategy with 
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the ancillary revenue generation business model to bridge the gap between low fares and 
required profit margins.
To further enhance unit cost efficiency, capacity is deployed strategically using more 













































Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.2
2.5 The goal of revenue generation in place of market share
Airline business strategies have shifted from maintaining and increasing market share to a 
requirement for revenue generation.  Historically, the general airline strategy objective was to 
maintain market share in the face of new competition even if the result was loss of revenue.  
Strong fare competition in the marketplace in a recessionary economy leaves little room for 
protecting a market.  Because strong cost control required in the face of volatile fuel prices, 
rising taxes and regulatory fees, fares are augmented on the revenue side with higher load 
factors supplemented by ancillary fees (Walker, 2013). 
In this sense, fares can be considered just a down payment for transportation. Ancillary fees 
add up to 15% to the base fare for a one way trip.  Airlines are profitable today because of the 
ancillary revenue stream.  Under this rubric ancillary fees, which are more or less payment 
for additional specific services, may be more consumer friendly that traditional fare hikes 
(Michael Boyd quoted in Pankratz, 2013). 
Even with these additional revenue streams available, mainline carriers are now willing to 
consider the elimination of routes that are not providing enough revenue or return on 
investment to further strengthen their balance sheets.  
2.6 Cost Control
In order to remain a going business concern, airlines must exercise creative and often brutal 
cost control.  Investors and the equities market demand this. Much attention is given to the 
cost per available seat mile (CASM) in Boardrooms, operations meetings and schedule and 
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planning meetings at most airlines every day.  High load factors can often help lower or 
maintain a CASM as unit costs decrease.
2.7 The changing relationship between mainline and regional carriers produces capacity 
agreements
The Capacity Purchase Agreement (CPA) now defines the relationship between mainline 
carriers and regional carriers to provide for hub feed today.  The notable exception is 
Southwest Airlines which continues to have no relationship at all with regional carriers.   
Each one of its destinations can be considered a hub or a focus city.
Rather than take an equity position in the regional carriers, the mainline carriers preferred to 
put their feeder service out to bid.  Carriers like SkyWest, Mesa, Republic and others had 
always franchised their services, mostly to a number of mainline carriers at the same time.   
Comair, a Delta Air Lines subsidiary, went out of business in the Delta bankruptcy.  Horizon 
Air, sister carrier to Alaska Airlines, evolved from independent flying and an interline type 
agreement with Alaska to a full CPA agreement.  The relationship of American Eagle with 
American Airlines is still unclear at the time of this writing pending emergence from 
bankruptcy and merger with US Airways.
In a CPA, a regional carrier contracts to perform flying for a mainline carrier over a certain 
periods of time with certain operating standards, goals and compensation.  The mainline 
carrier pays the regional carrier a negotiated price which may include incentives and fines 
based on negotiated operational or financial criteria.  For its part, the mainline carrier 
schedules for the regional and takes all of the revenue from tickets sold.  The regional is 
responsible for its own costs, though some versions of the CPA may allow the regional to 
park in the mainline leased gates at the hub and may be ground handled by mainline staff.  
Some CPAs may provide fuel or allow the regional to purchase fuel at the mainline carrier’s 
price.  The benefit to the regional is that it has a guaranteed revenue stream, though it must 
exercise strong cost control in order to make a profit.
One beneficial advantage to a CPA to the mainline carrier is that it can schedule a regional at 
odd times or even to a city where the mainline is losing money because of inefficient load 
factors. The regional can provide the smaller number of seats and perhaps more frequency to 
more closely match the demand in the market.  The passenger boardings remain the same or 
higher.  This allows the mainline to schedule the larger aircraft previously used on the route 
to another city pair where the size and operating economics lower the CASM and perhaps 
increase the total RPM and revenue over the system.  A CPA relationship can essentially 
have the effect of adding large aircraft and ASMs to the system without the need to actually 
purchase or lease new aircraft.
2.8 The effect of declining EAS subsidy on regional carrier operation 
There are 242 commercial airports in the United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) served 
by regional aircraft only (Regional Airline Association, 2013).   One hundred and twenty five 
of these regional only airports are served without benefit of government subsidy in the form 
of Essential Air Service (EAS) grants (Pankratz, 2013).  There are 121 cities that do receive 
EAS subsidies (Pankratz, 2013), including four not on the regional airport list supplied by the 
RAA.
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These non-EAS cities are either self-sustaining with passenger traffic or attract carriers by 
offering local inducements for service.  These inducements can be supplied by local 
governments or business or both.   In revenue guarantee agreement the city promises to pay 
the airline the difference between actual revenues and agreed to revenues.  A seat bank is a 
plan in which businesses promise to buy a set number of seats for their employees’ business 
travel for certain periods of time.  Business organizations and governments might also 
promise to contribute marketing dollars to stimulate traffic to their city.
2.9 The economic cause and effect of transferring passenger traffic to regional carriers
The dotcom bubble burst in 2000 and the effects of 9/11 weakened the economy further.  
Airlines were quick to shrink capacity.  Between 2000 and 2003 ASMs decreased by -5.11%.  
RPMs decreased slightly faster at -6.42%.  After this period of traffic stress there was a 
general trend of increases in ASMs in US domestic capacity as the industry responded to the 
economic recovery.  ASMs continued to increase as the economy improved until the 











































Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.3
In terms of percentage of total ASMs and RPMs, there is a steady transfer of ASMs from 
mainline to regional services (Figure 2.4).  Revenue generation through RPMs appears to 
follow this trend very well.
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Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.4
Despite a further drop in industry capacity leading up to the recession of 2008, regional 
carrier ASMs remained firm at 2005 levels.  The strength of this capacity transfer is apparent.  








































Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.5
The mainline ASMs continued to decrease for the 2005 to 2010 period (Figure 2.6), 
accelerated by the business objectives shift to increased cost control, the evolution from 
market share to revenue generation, and, most importantly, capacity discipline.  This trend 
has pushed load factors above 80%.











































Source:  Computed from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013a
Figure 2.6
2.10 Route shift to regional carriers becomes the new hub strategy
Since 2007 the business model of mainline carriers is to concentrate on hub to hub, long 
distance and proven heavy spoke routes to hubs.  They franchise out medium range thin 
routes, spoke and speculative routes to regional carriers.  Regional carriers provide 
appropriate aircraft capacity for medium range thin routes at reasonable operating costs.  In 
addition, regional carriers can provide increased frequency which can often mean the 
difference in keeping a city open. 
An analysis of nine cities gives a broad overview of the evolution of hubs and former hubs 
since 2007.  Three tools are useful in bringing clarity and dimension to what is occurring in 
each city.
2.10.1 Market share
Market share can identify the strongest carrier regardless of the size of the market.  A 
comparison of values in 2007 with those of 2012 is an indicator of the relative importance 
each carrier places on a city as individual business models and goals evolved in the recession.  
In some cases the dominate carrier retained or strengthened its position.  In others another 
carrier took advantage of opportunities to strengthen its position.  Some cities remained stable 
with no carrier acquiring a dominate market share that characterizes a true hub.
2.10.2 Departure seats
A look at yearly departure seats in 2007 and 2012 is an indicator of the willingness of carriers 
to invest capital assets in a city.  The comparison of the two years will produce a trend which 
reflects the strength of the market, especially with the acceptance of high load factors as a 
given business assumption.
2.10.3 Average seats per aircraft
An analysis of average seats per aircraft will indicate the relative use of regional aircraft in a 
city.  From the point of view of scope clauses in many pilot union contracts a regional aircraft 
is 100 seats or less.  Current regional aircraft have 90 seats or less.  An average aircraft 
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capacity of less than 100 seats will imply a predominance of regional aircraft in a market.  
Conversely, average aircraft capacity over 100 will indicate more mainline aircraft and of a 
larger size in a city.  A comparison of average capacity in 2007 with 2012 reveals either shifts 
from one type of aircraft to another or a stable and continuing use of one aircraft category.
2.11 Market share shifts in certain cities between the recession of 2007 and 2012
2.11.1 Boston












Market Share - BOS
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.7
JetBlue has taken advantage of other carrier actions in Boston to increase its market share in 
Boston by almost 13 points since 2007.  This includes growth in frequency flown by E195 
aircraft taking advantage of the withdrawal of American Eagle.  JetBlue has established a hub 
with over 35 destinations.  Departure seats in the market by all airlines have stayed relatively 











































Market Share - CVG
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.8
DENNIS & STEVENS 12
In 2007 Cincinnati was a major hub for Delta Air Lines emphasizing feed from its regional 
carrier Comair.  Comair had its own terminal building and maintenance facility at CVG.  
Delta declared bankruptcy and with it Comair.  Delta merged with Northwest Airlines and 
acquired Northwest’s major hub in Minneapolis and decommissioned CVG as a hub.  Comair 
restructured into a much smaller carrier.  Available seats in the market dropped over 63% 
between 2007 and 2012 to 4m departing seats.  However, the average seat capacity per 
aircraft remained almost constant at close to 70 seats (Innovata, 2013).  This demonstrates the 
continuing reliance on regional service to feed local demand through what remains of this 
once thriving hub.
2.11.3 Las Vegas












Market Share - LAS
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.9
Southwest has cashed in on Las Vegas and has made it its own after America West and US 
Airways merged and closed their hub in 2008.  Nevertheless, total departing seats in LAS has 
declined 15% since 2007/2008.  The dominance of Southwest as well as a large 142 average 
seat capacity per aircraft makes LAS more like a European hub with a single large carrier and 
few regional aircraft (Innovata, 2013). Southwest feeds itself passengers throughout its 
system.  It does not code share with other carriers.  It does not contract with regional carriers 
to feed its system in any city.
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2.11.4 Los Angeles
 












Market Share - LAX
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.10
The domestic market share at Los Angeles International Airport has remained stable in recent 
years.  Regional carrier SkyWest has always been a major player with their business strategy 
of remaining independent while performing code share and CPA flying for United and Delta.  
American Eagle has maintained their own unit terminal at LAX providing regional services 
to American Airlines.  In 2007 regional carrier Horizon Air began flights to LAX in support 
of Alaska Airlines.  Seat investment from LAX has remained stable and the average seat 
capacity of aircraft has gone from 132 in 2007 to 141 in 2012 (Innovata, 2013).  This growth 
in seats per aircraft reflects the larger aircraft flown by international and mainline carriers as 
well as the regional carriers feeding the hub.
2.11.5 Memphis 












Market Share - MEM
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.11
Memphis became a hub for Northwest Airlines when it acquired Republic Airlines through a 
merger in 1986.  It served as transfer point for former Republic routes in the Southeastern 
part of the United States.  The hub was dismantled after Northwest’s merger with Delta Air 
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Lines in 2008, declining from 7.3m departing seats in 2007 to 4.4m in 2012.  The emphasis 
on use of regional aircraft remains apparent as the average capacity per aircraft increased on 
71 seats to 74 seats in the same period (Innovata, 2013).
2.11.6 Pittsburgh

















Market Share - PIT
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.12
Pittsburgh no longer dominated by a single carrier after US Airways withdrew its regional 
hub.  While Southwest has increased its percentage, carriers other than Southwest carry over 
80% of the market.   Carriers invested 7.1 m departing seats into the Pittsburgh market in 
2007.  But by 2012 this number had fallen 4.9% to 4.9m departing seats.  The average seat 
capacity rose by 20% to 91 seats per aircraft (Innovata, 2013), well under the lower limit of 
mainline aircraft of about 110 seats.  
2.11.7 Raleigh/Durham












Market Share - RDU
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.13
Raleigh/Durham is not a hub in the classic sense.  Its location on the East Coast denies it the 
hub requirement of a central location.  Southwest, Delta and US Airways have picked up 
some extra market share at the cost of American.  The withdrawal of Eagle was not absorbed 
in the American Airlines. ExpressJet appears to have picked up some of the Eagle market.  
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After the 2007/2008 recession, departing seats fell 17.8% to 6m in 2012.  Average capacity 
per aircraft of 93 indicates wide use of regional aircraft raised somewhat by the presence of 
Southwest capacity (Innovata, 2013). 

































Market Share - STL
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.14
Lambert-St Louis Field was the major hub for TWA when it was purchased by American 
Airlines in 2001.  The hub was decommissioned by American and market dominance was 
taken over by Southwest Airlines.  Because Southwest is the only major carrier which does 
not have regional feed, the average seats per aircraft actually rose from 91 seats in 2007 to 
101 in 2012 (Innovata, 2013).  This reflects Southwest’s use of a 737 fleet flying almost 50% 
of the market.
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2.11.9 Washington Reagan 

















Market Share - DCA
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013
Figure 2.15
Washington Reagan traffic has been stable with a diversity of market share.  The airport is 
saturated and a recent slot swap from US Airways to Delta helped Delta gain some market 
share.  Washington Reagan is the closest airport to Washington, DC.  Operating at near 
capacity, every seat into the airport counts.  The average number of seats per aircraft has 
stayed constant at about 93 seats (Innovata, 2013), demonstrating high use of regional 
aircraft.
3. THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
A number of different strategies have emerged from the traditional European flag carriers in 
addressing the performance of services away from their main hub airports and cities. 
Although driven by competitive considerations, other factors such as geography, the type and 
volume of demand, political pressure and fleet availability also come into play. Some of these 
approaches also appear to have been more successful than others. The main strategies 
adopted are discussed in more detail below.
3.1 Offload regional aircraft to a lower cost provider with different branding 
British Airways (BA) in the UK regions (primarily concentrated on Birmingham and 
Manchester but also including some Scottish routes) transferred all services of its regional 
subsidiary BA Connect to flybe in 2007. BA acquired a 15% stake in flybe as part of this 
process. Table 3.1 below shows how flybe turned a substantial loss on BA Connect into a 
marginal profit in the course of two years. This appears to be less due to cost control however 
than to increasing load factors, cutting headline fares and raising incidental revenues. As 
flybe was still operating with much of BA Connect's old fleet and staff in 2007-08, the year 
2010-11 has also been considered for comparison. This shows no significant further cost 
reduction however. There has clearly been downward pressure on yields and other revenues 
have escalated further in an attempt to compensate. Load factors have eased back to 60% 
with the new larger capacity aircraft being added. Average length of passenger journey has 
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reduced from 664 km in 2006 to 508 km in 2011 however. This does imply some cost 
efficiencies at equivalent stage length.
Table 3.1
Unit costs and revenues BA connect v flybe
BA Connect 2005-06 Cost per ASK 9.8p
Year to 31 Mar 06 Cost per ASK ex fuel 8.3p
Fare revenue per RPK 14.7p
Other revenue per RPK 0.7p
Total revenue per RPK 15.4p
Average aircraft size 66 seats
Load factor 56%
Operating profit -£41.6M
Flybe 2007-08 Cost per ASK 10.1p
Year to 31 Mar 08 Cost per ASK ex fuel   8.6p
Fare revenue per RPK 14.0p
Other revenue per RPK 2.6p
Total revenue per RPK 16.6p
Average aircraft size 76 seats
Load factor 62%
Operating profit £7.0M
Flybe 2010-11 Cost per ASK 10.6p
Year to 31 Mar 11 Cost per ASK ex fuel   8.9p
Fare revenue per RPK 13.1p
Other revenue per RPK 4.3p
Total revenue per RPK 17.4p
Average aircraft size 88 seats
Load factor 60%
Operating profit -£2.4M
Source: Calculated from UK Civil Aviation Authority Airline Financial Reports
Flybe has generally lost market share compared to the former BA Connect operation (Table 
3.2) with Ryanair and easyJet expanding. BA was just reduced to its London Heathrow and 
Gatwick routes, the latter also withdrawn from March 2013. BA maintained a code share with 
flybe for the first few years but this has now gone except on certain routes from Gatwick 
where there is some synergy in terms of connecting possibilities. flybe itself is withdrawing 
from Gatwick in 2014. There is a code share with Air France (flybe's original partner) on 
selected regional routes. flybe has more recently undertaken a similar exercise in taking over 
the regional flying of Finnair. It is claimed that the Q400 has a similar trip cost to an 
EMB145 but provides 50% more seats (Kirby, 2011). As it is a faster aircraft than 
conventional turbo-props, block times are little different on sectors up to 500 miles.
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Table 3.2
Air service developments at Manchester 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
BA flybe BA flybe
2005 22% 1% 78 89
2009  6% 10% 138 79
2013  5% 9% 124 82
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
Air France has also made a move in this direction by launching Hop! This incorporates the 
regional aircraft operations of Brit Air, Regional and Airlinair (Halstead, 2012, 2013). While 
remaining a wholly owned subsidiary, it has also introduced bag charges and reduced 
included services. Otherwise nothing much seems to have changed and it is unclear what 
advantages the rebranding is expected to bring!
3.2 Maintain main line branding but seek lower labour costs
This is the strategy British Airways has adopted at Gatwick and Air France has attempted to 
introduce to the French regions. BA has simplified its Gatwick fleet by eliminating the 
smaller less efficient 737-300 and 737-500 series aircraft in place of the larger 737-400 series. 
These have 149 economy class seats in BA layout, still significantly below the maximum 
potential of 188. Seat pitch is typically 31-32 inches as against 28-29 inches on an LCC, 
while galleys and three washrooms take up further space. Operation of a Club Europe cabin 
on international flights reduces the available capacity further as centre seats are left empty. 
The aircraft are old and lease rates are likely to be low; this must be offset against higher fuel 
and maintenance costs however (Kingsley-Jones, 2012). It also means that utilisation is not a 
primary concern although the carrier managed a respectable 8.3 hours per day on an average 
stage length of 960 km compared to 8.9 hours and 1076 km on its similarly sized A320s 
based at Heathrow. easyJet obtains 9.9 hours on an almost identical average stage length of 
984 km with its A319s (CAA UK Airline Statistics, 2012). On-board service is the normal 
BA product including hot meals in Club Europe and cooked breakfast in economy on early 
morning domestic flights. From March 2012, lower fares without checked baggage have been 
offered from Gatwick, in contrast to the Heathrow operation. BA's Gatwick flights are 
heavily focused on leisure destinations, both short-haul and long-haul. Routes with 
significant business or feeder content such as Toulouse, Marseille, Bologna and Luxembourg 
have been shifted to Heathrow in recent years, leading to the decline in BA's presence at 
Gatwick shown in Table 3.3. Glasgow, Edinburgh and Amsterdam are the sole survivors of a 
once extensive network to major short-haul destinations. Different labour contracts (possibly 
made easier by the growth of LCC operators at Gatwick which provides an immediate 
reference point - unlike at Heathrow!) coupled with the outsourcing of ground handling to 
Swissport in October 2012 gives BA a significantly lower cost base than at its main hub.
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Table 3.3
Air service developments at London Gatwick 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
BA easyJet flybe BA easyjet flybe
2005 38% 17%^ 3% 142 156 105
2009 20% 31%^ 6% 151 158 92
2013 16% 41% 3% 160 162 87
^ Includes easyjet Switzerland
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
Air France has undertaken a similar strategy from its regional bases in Marseille, Nice and 
Toulouse and Paris Orly. These offer the mainline AF branding and product albeit with lower 
labour costs and faster turn-arounds; a lower fare option without baggage or FFP credits has 
recently been added (Business Traveller, 2013). This was originally launched in October 
2011 as an offensive strategy to resist the incursion of LCCs in the French regional markets. 
Regional aircraft with high unit costs have been replaced with larger A319 and A320 
equipment and new routes launched, typically at low frequencies with variable schedules by 
day of the week (rather akin to Ryanair). For example, Marseille-Prague operates on Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Saturday only with Toulouse-Venice on Tuesday, Saturday and Sunday only. 
At Marseille, Air France's capacity share has risen to 40% from 35% in 2009 and a low point 
of 32% in 2010, while average aircraft size has increased from 104 seats in 2009 to 149 seats 
in 2013. Some new routes have already been pulled however and the continuing roll-out put 
on hold (Centre for Aviation, 2012; Halstead, 2012, 2013). 
3.3 Replace main line capacity with a quasi LCC brand using large aircraft
This approach has the benefit of completely segregating the labour forces and saves further 
by reducing the quality of service to the passenger because there is no longer an obligation to 
maintain the mainline brand and product specification. As with the transfer of regional 
operations, the downside is that yields are also likely to go down and connecting passengers 
may be lost. This therefore makes it more suitable for application away from the main hub 
airports or cities where there is little network synergy (Suau-Sanchez and Burghouwt, 2012). 
Iberia has gone down this route by allowing Vueling to take over services away from Madrid 
(particularly at Barcelona which was previously a main base for the airline - Aviation 
Strategy, December 2011).  Table 3.4 shows how Vueling capacity has replaced Iberia 
capacity with the exception of the Madrid route (Buyck, 2012). Iberia made a brief excursion 
into substituting mainline equipment with regional aircraft six years ago that was rapidly 
abandoned when fuel prices soared. Vueling is far from being a conventional LCC however 
with many legacy carrier features including code-shares, interlining, multi-class cabin and 
allocated seats (Sparaco, 2012; Klophaus et al, 2012).
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Table 3.4
Air service developments at Barcelona 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
Iberia Vueling Iberia Vueling
2005 41% 5% 130 166
2009 13% 25%^ 96 154
2013 6% 36% 159 176
^ includes Click Air
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
Lufthansa has followed by proposing that short-haul services operated by LH mainline from 
airports other than Frankfurt and Munich will be transferred to germanwings (Buyck, 2012). 
This was trialled at Stuttgart (Table 3.5) and the plan is to roll it out to other airports such as 
Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Berlin etc (Halstead, 2013). This had not yet been implemented by 
Summer 2013 however. If a code-share is maintained then it is difficult to save on areas such 
as distribution costs and handling of transfer bags. By remaining linked to the major's FFP, 
loyalty can be tapped and traffic kept in house but again at the expense of higher costs. It is 
not a good strategy for the main hub airports because the feeder traffic to long-haul services 
is left with an inferior and uncompetitive product. If someone is booking business or first 
class to Los Angeles they will not appreciate being squeezed into economy class with no 
legroom and no free drinks on a full plane for the short-haul connecting leg! This is why the 
US majors all still maintain first class on domestic routes and have even been adding it to 
their larger regional aircraft in the last few years. 
Table 3.5
Air service developments at Stuttgart 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
Lufthansa  germanwings Lufthansa  germanwings
2005 23% 14% 75 135
2009 21% 21% 80 140
2013 8% 33% 98 148
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
Aer Lingus has gone in a similar direction by converting the whole airline and brand to an 
LCC. Business class is no longer offered except on transatlantic, seating densities have been 
increased while food and bags are on a pay for basis. The airline no longer participates fully 
in GDS or interlining and withdrew from the oneworld global alliance. It does offer intraline 
connections between its own services at Dublin however. Perhaps realising that it is throwing 
away revenue without these measures it is inching back towards code-sharing and through 
ticketing with a variety of other carriers including United, British Airways and Etihad. It is 
difficult to see how Ryanair's plans to take over Aer Lingus would improve things as by 
surrendering much of the Aer Lingus short-haul network for regulatory reasons, the 
transatlantic flights will either be devoid of feeder traffic - or Ryanair will have to abandon its 
lowest cost mantra and start offering connections from its own services including the volume 
of baggage associated with transatlantic flights - or it will have to sign a code-share or feeder 
deal with the mooted new operators of these routes such as flybe.
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Air France/KLM has moved leisure routes to Transavia (Halstead, 2012) which provides 
another possible compromise - to keep the mainline brand for business focused and major 
city routes only where competition is fierce and there is a market willing to pay a premium. 
For holiday destinations where there is little in the way of connecting traffic, alternative 
routes or the scope for high yields, a more basic product is suitable.
3.4 Other strategies
3.4.1 Replace mainline capacity with regional aircraft
After a period in which all routes were operated with A320 equipment (a similar fleet 
approach to that of easyjet or Ryanair), Aer Lingus has introduced Aer Lingus Regional in 
conjunction with Aer Arran and converted many thinner markets, especially between Ireland 
and the UK where distances are short but an over-water crossing is still involved, to turbo-
prop operation with ATR42/72s (Buyck, 2010). Aer Lingus found many of its routes were 
simply too small for the 150 seaters and frequency is still a useful competitive weapon on 
short range routes with surface alternatives or substitute airports nearby. It has also enabled 
them to re-enter markets that had been dominated by Ryanair with large aircraft and low 
frequencies. This appears to be 'reinventing the wheel' - frequency does still matter! (Table 
3.6) 
Table 3.6
Change in Aer Lingus operations: Dublin-UK markets weekly frequencies 2009-13
July 2009 July 2013          Notes
Dublin to:
Aberdeen - 7xAT7          New route replacing Ryanair
Birmingham 18x320      20x320, 20xAT7      Competes with Ryanair
Bournemouth - 4xAT4                  New route replacing Ryanair
Bristol - 17xAT4          New route competing with Ryanair
Edinburgh 13x320 27xAT7, 3xAT4      Competes with Ryanair
Glasgow 7x320  27xAT7, 4xAT4      Competes with Ryanair (Prestwick)
 Cork to:
Birmingham 4x320 14xAT7
Glasgow - 5xAT7          New route
Manchester 4x320 14xAT7          Competed with bmibaby in 2009
Shannon to:
Birmingham - 7xAT7          New route replacing Ryanair
Edinburgh - 7xAT7          New route replacing Ryanair
Manchester - 13xAT7          New route replacing Ryanair
Source: OAG
At Porto, TAP has reduced aircraft size using former Portugalia equipment (the regional 
carrier was acquired by TAP in 2006) to maintain frequencies in the face of LCC growth 
(Table 3.7). Although the airport has seen a dramatic increase in traffic this has almost 
accrued to Ryanair (and easyjet with a 10% market share in 2013) rather than the home 
carrier. TAP (including Portugalia) has held its total number of flights and route network 
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from Porto roughly constant over the last decade but market share has slumped from 61% to 
30% due to reduced gauge.
Table 3.7
Air service developments at Porto 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
TAP Portugalia Ryanair TAP Portugalia Ryanair
2005 39% 22%      4% 145 69     189
2009 44% -      25% 108 -     189
2013 30% -      37% 105 -     189
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
There are few other recent examples of this in Europe - where regional aircraft have not 
found favour to the same extent as in the US. Reasons behind this include congestion and slot 
shortages at many major European airports as well as airport and navigation charges which 
are loaded against smaller aircraft. With shorter distances and more alternative travel modes 
than in the US there is a less captive market for air travel and in many cases business travel 
volumes are insufficient to cover the cost of small aircraft operations. Where major airlines 
do have significant established regional operations as with Air France and Lufthansa, the 
trend is towards larger aircraft at lower frequency. At Milan airports for example, Lufthansa's 
average aircraft size increased from 88 seats in 2005 to 133 seats in 2013 while at Marseille 
Air France has gone from 106 to 141 seats over the same time period.
Regional aircraft are perhaps more useful in Europe to maintain hub feed, especially where 
the local market has been eroded by LCCs, than for secondary bases in the network that cater 
mostly for point-to-point demand. 
3.4.2 Abandon markets to other carriers
Some airlines - particularly those in financial difficulties - have had to restructure by pulling 
out of secondary markets altogether and leaving other carriers to fill the gap. Alitalia at Milan 
is one of the best examples. Malpensa was a major hub for the airline ten years ago, taking 
advantage of its more central position in Europe and high yield local market. It had less local 
demand than Rome however, leaving Alitalia more exposed to competition from stronger 
alternative hubs to the north (Beria et al, 2011). Over the last decade, Alitalia has seen its 
traffic at Malpensa shrink from 59% to 5% of the market (Table 3.8). Many foreign airlines 
have increased service marginally (Lufthansa attempting to build an Italian presence through 
Lufthansa Italia that was also abandoned - Halstead, 2011) but easyJet is the main 
replacement for Alitalia, have grown in the space of eight years to a third of the market. Total 
capacity from Malpensa peaked in 2007 at 15.8 million outbound seats but has since declined 
to around 12 million implying that some of the hub traffic has been lost forever.
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Table 3.8
Air service developments at Milan Malpensa 2005-13
Market share by departing seats Average aircraft size (seats)
AlitaliaLufthansa  easyjet Alitalia Lufthansa  easyjet
2005 59% 5%      0% 124 83      -
2009 8% 13%      24% 163 116     155
2013 5% 7%      31% 174 125     160
Source: Compiled from Innovata data
3.4.3 Carry on as before
The remaining strategy seems to be simply soldier on regardless, as if the world has not 
changed. This may demonstrate that the existing operations are viable or alternatively that the 
airline is too slow to adapt or under political pressure to maintain services.
This is exemplified by SAS at Stockholm Arlanda (average aircraft size 127 seats unchanged 
from 2005-13, market share down only slightly from 46% to 43%). SAS at Oslo (average 
aircraft size up from 143 to 152 seats, market share down from 58% to 42% - eroded by 
Norwegian). Given the 50% state ownership by Denmark, Norway and Sweden any change is 
fraught with political sensitivities (Aviation Strategy, March 2011; Flottau, 2011).
Swiss which largely withdrew from Geneva in the wake of the collapse of Swissair has 
started creeping back in with a market share of around 16% - this is still well behind easyjet 
with 36% however.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Economic and competitive pressures have caused mainline carriers in Europe and the United 
States to re-evaluate their business plans. This retrenchment began in 2000 but developed 
with special urgency in the global recession of 2007/2008. Mainline carriers have responded 
differently in Europe and the United States (Liu et al, 2013).
In Europe LCCs began to put pressure on legacy carriers in their historical local markets and 
within the intra-European market. European legacy carriers had to re-evaluate their route 
structure and protect their hub feed while operating within a developing European Union 
business environment. A variety of business and survival strategies developed in relationships 
with regional carriers and second-tier LCCs, including equity stakes, transfer of routes, 
aircraft and staff. 
Launching an LCC brand would appear to be particularly appropriate to airlines where a 
significant part of their home country demand is away from the main hub airports/cities and 
they are unwilling to surrender the regional markets completely to other carriers. SAS is a 
clear case in point - it may have to eventually bite the bullet and change the non-Copenhagen 
services to a new more downmarket product. TAP could do this at Porto and it may also 
provide an opportunity for them to re-enter Faro which has been virtually abandoned to LCCs. 
For Alitalia it is less realistic because the high yield traffic is in northern Italy whereas the 
main hub is in Rome. Similarly for Swiss where their USP in Geneva is being a full-service 
carrier in a high yield market. Extensive regional aircraft operations only appear viable under 
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such conditions unless feeding a major hub. The critical balance as always lies between costs 
and yields - an LCC brand and product can do much to reduce costs but risks trashing yields 
in the process.
Because of the geographic size of the United States and its domestic market competition, 
strategies toward hubs and regional carriers evolved toward changes in basic business 
assumptions. The trend is to divest equity interest in regional carriers and return to 
contractual and code sharing relationships. In order to maintain passenger feed and lower 
costs while maintaining revenue generation, major carriers transfer ASMs to regional carriers 
by means of CPAs and code sharing. The exception has been Southwest Airlines which 
continues to find success without the use of passenger feed from regional carriers.
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